A few months ago, I came across a series of videos of ibiswi vy’inkona, that is children, adolescents and young people associated with the current main political party, the National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). Ibiswi vy’inkona means ’eaglets’. An eagle is one of the three party’s symbols, which also include a sword (inkota) and a cassava leaf (ibabi ry’umwumbati). These symbols are represented on the party’s flag. According to the rules governing the CNDD-FDD, the raven means strength (inguvu), agility (ububangutsi) and perseverance (kutarambirwa). The videos show ibiswi vy’inkona’s parades during CNDD-FDD ceremonies and events. The parades have a military air. The ibiswi vy’inkona are also described as abana b’ abahoze mu rugamba, which can be translated as ‘children of former combatants’ or ‘children of war veterans’. The videos show boys and girls, some who are kindergarten school age (3-5 years old), marching like soldiers.
At these festive public events organised by the CNDD-FDD, ibiswi vy’inkona shout political slogans, which ruling party members applaud. A certain militarism characterises their catchphrases. Words such as urugamba (struggle) are used several times. A slogan, which particularly, struck a chord with me says, ‘igihugu ntigitorwa, kirarwanirwa!‘ (‘you can’t just pick up a country; you fight for it!’). The slogan seems to refer to the ruling party’s military origins, which it has not yet completely shed off, twenty years after the end of the conflict. Underpinning these slogans is also a fear that the gains of the civil war might be at risk, within a context characterised by a multisectoral crisis in Burundi and regional instability in the Great Lakes region.
The case of ibiswi vy’inkona illustrates the continuing politicisation and militarism of young people in Burundi. The remnants of a culture of militarism continue to be spread to new generations of Burundians. This phenomenon is not new. During the party-state era, the Union for National Progress (UPRONA) (1966-2003), the party had a youth wing, the Jeunesse Révolutionaire Rwagasore (JRR), made primarily of young adults. UPRONA also had a children’s section, composed of school-age children named ‘Pioneers’, who would march in during official events. Some members of the JRR have been accused of participating in the repression and massacres of Hutu that took place in 1972. While the ruling elite has changed in post-conflict Burundi, past governance practices have been perpetuated. For instance, the CNDD-FDD has relied on the Imbonerakure also called the CNDD-FDD Jeunesse (Youth) in the repression of political opponents, particularly since the political crisis of 2015 in Burundi. Since 2016, an Imbonerakure Day is celebrated throughout the country.
Pioneers and ibiswi vy’inkona are not ‘child soldiers’. However,they raise questions around the links between the normalisation of children’s militarism and politicisation in periods of negative peace and the phenomenon of child soldiering during violent conflict within a specific context. What does a continuation of a culture of militarism within the wider society and transmitted to children through the ruling party mean for sustainable peace and reconciliation in Burundi?
By Pamela Nzabampema